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Abstract: Our paper evaluates the capital structure of Malaysian firms from a unique 
perspective by evaluating the impact of Shari’ah compliance on firms’ financing decision. 
We find that firms that are Shari’ah compliant tend to lean towards lower debt issues to 
finance their deficits, implying that the compliance status has an impact on their cost of 
equity which ultimately affects cost of capital.  
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There are several main competing 
explanation of capital structure when 
evaluating how firms their deficit. The general 
contention between the theories have centred 
around the cost of capital, whereby managers 
serving the interests of shareholders’ would be 
keen on lowering cost of capital to maximize 
firm value.  
We examine how Malaysian firms finance 
their deficit by studying a unique factor 
(Shari’ah compliance) which could have 
implications on the cost of capital given that 
the nature of compliance could impose 
restrictions on the capital structure. Our 
findings imply that firms which are non-
compliant are better able to access the debt 
market due to lack of restrictions imposed on 
the funding sources. However, the relative 
preference for equity by compliant firms could 
also imply a lower cost of equity, raising an 
interesting question for future research.  
The next section provides a brief literature on 
motiving the study. The section is followed by 
a brief explanation of the data as well 
variables, and the analysis of the results. 
Implications and conclusion are presented in 
the last section.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deficit Function.  
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study 
financing behaviour based on the net debt 
issues. The authors hypothesize that if the 
pecking order hypothesis holds, the empirical 
results should yield a unity result. Their results 
provide support for their notion as the net debt 
issues tracks the deficit function closely. 
However, Frank and Goyal (2003) find that 
net equity issues track the deficit function as 
opposed to the net debt issues. Huang and 
Ritter (2009) further prove that the pecking 
order explanation is insignificant in some 
years.  
METHODOLOGY 
 
To maximize the number of firm year 
observations, we start our sample by including 
all firms available from the Datastream 
Thomson Reuters database. Our period ranges 
from 2007 – 2016. Our sample selection is 
guided by data availability and the objective of 
measuring net debt issues. We avoid selection 
and survivorship bias by including dead firms 
in our sample (Hussain, 2014). Drawing from 
the literature, we exclude all financial firms 
(Guney and Iqbal-Hussain, 2010).  
 
 Our study uses nbalanced panel data to allow  
better inference of model parameters, more 
accurate capturing of firms’ issuing behavior 
due to econometric efficiency and limiting the 
impact of omitted variables that allow the 
control of missing or unobservable variables. 
The use of variables to explain our model is 
based on the literature and defined accordingly 
(Haron et al, 2013 and Hussain et al, 2016). 
We define net debt issues, (Δd) as the net 
change in total book debt scaled by total 
assets. Net equity issues (Δe) is the net change 
in book equity minus the change in retained 
earnings divided by total assets. Firms’ SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of net sales in millions 
of 2007 ringgit. TANG, asset tangibility is net 
plant, property and equipment over total 
assets. Profitability (PROF) is measured by 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets. 
Furthermore, we proxy for growth 
opportunities using R&D (research and 
development) expenses and CAPEX (capital 
expenditure). Both variables are scaled by total 
assets (Iqbal-Hussain et al, 2015). 
 
Guided by the literature on capital structure, 
we eliminate outliers by eliminating 
observations where net equity issues, book 
value of debt and net debt issues are over 
100% (Hussain et al, 2017). Furthermore, we 
drop firm-year observations with missing data. 
Our final sample comprises of 818 firms with 
7245 firm-year observations. We report the 
summary statistics of the variables used in the 
study in Table 1. 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
To measure the extent of financing via debt 
issues we interact a dummy variable (NSC) 
non-Shari’ah compliant  with the deficit term 
(DEF) in our regression which is defined 
based on Guney and Iqbal-Hussain (2009).   
Our basic model is as follows: 
 
Δ𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(DEF x NSC)𝑖 + 𝛽2Δ𝑆IZE𝑖 
+ 𝛽3Δ𝑇ANG𝑖 + 𝛽4Δ𝑅&𝐷𝑖 +𝛽5Δ𝑃ROF𝑖 + 
𝛽6Δ𝐶APEX + 𝜀𝑖                                                           (1) 
 
All our regressions control for firm fixed 
effects, report the coefficients and p-values, 
based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
year to avoid correlation of observations 
across time for a given firm and correlation 
across firms for a given year (see Peterson, 
2009). This is to avoid biased standard errors 
in our unbalanced panel dataset regressions. 
Our results are robust to using White (1980) 
standard errors, although White standard 
errors are generally smaller and would yield 
‘more’ significant results i.e. smaller p-values. 
Drawing from similar studies in the literature, 
we predict the deficit coefficient to be positive 
(Iqbal-Hussain and Guney, 2011). In addition 
we conjecture the interaction term would be 
positive. Our study assumes the cost of equity 
remains constant. To provide additional 
controls and increase robustness of our results, 
we include known determinants in equation 
(1). The SIZE variable is expected to be 
positive given that larger firms would be able 
to afford more debt in their balance sheet 
while tangibility is also expected to have a 
similar coefficient as tangible assets serve as 
debt collateral. Growth is proxied by including 
research and development expenditures as well 
as capital expenditures. The correlation for 
profitability remains fuzzy as profitable firms 
would want to reduce the amount of taxes paid 
by increasing debt issues (as interest payments 
are tax deductible). But increasing cash flows 
would also reduce the reliance on external 
sources of financing. We test for 
multicollinearity for our regressions and find 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 
10 indicating the absence of multicollinearity 
issues. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Our results are reported and discussed in this 
section. We provide the results for regressing 
the model in equation (1) in Table 2. Our 
regressions control for firm fixed effects the 
remove omitted time invariant firm factors that 
may lead to a spurious correlation between net 
debt issues and expalanatory variables while 
controlling for firm specific differences, which 
are time invariant such as specific customer 
characteristics, talented management and 
economic shocks. All regressions include  
industry dummies [0, 1] variables. 
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Looking at Table 2, the first column reports 
the regression that the deficit function has a 
positive coefficient as expected.To satisfy our 
objective, the next column reports the 
 regression results for the interaction term as 
well as control variables based on the known 
determinants of capital structure. This allows 
us to capture how non-Shariah  
 
 
compliance influences the financing of the 
deficit. The results report the interaction term 
to be positive and significant thus validating 
our notion that firms which are compliant 
would increase reliance on equity issues and 
vice-versa and are in line with Thabet et al 
(2017). Our results are also economically 
significant, as the coefficient of the deficit has 
been reduced. 
 
Our results allow us to infer that Shari’ah 
compliance is not only statistically but also 
economically significant in explaining capital 
structure decisions i.e. net debt issues. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R2 improves when 
the interaction term is included, suggesting the 
inclusion allows an increase in power of 
explanation. The last column reports the 
results of the regression when the known 
determinants discussed in equation (2) are 
included into the estimation. Size, tangibility 
and growth proxies all have positive and 
significant coefficients. Profitability however 
has a negative and insignificant coefficient. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our paper uses unbalanced Malaysian panel 
data to empirically test the capital structure 
implications from Shari’ah compliance. The 
main notion of the paper is to show that 
managers of Shari’ah compliant companies 
increase reliance on equity relative to non-
compliant companies.  
 
Drawing from the literature, we regress net 
debt issues against the financing deficit, which 
is interacted with a non-compliance dummy. 
The initial results confirms our hypothesis. 
Our findings are economically as well as 
statistically significant.  
 
The implications of our findings show that 
Shari’ah compliant firms are restricted in 
financing their deficit with debt issues and 
thus tend to place a heaiver reliance on equity 
issues. This raises an important question on 
the understanding of capital structure of 
Shari’ah compliant companies in terms of the 
relative cost of equity as well as ownership 
structure which we delegate to future 
researchers.  
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Table 1 
 
  d/A e/A DEF ∆SIZE ∆TANG ∆R&D ∆PROF ∆CAPEX 
Mean 0.0108 0.0382 0.0501 0.1028 0.0014 -0.0018 0.0056 0.0044 
Median 0.0002 0.0292 0.0308 0.0425 0.0020 0.0002 0.0022 0.0008 
Maximum 0.9241 0.9692 1.7238 6.2889 0.7868 0.0308 2.4569 0.6845 
Std Dev 0.1428 0.3122 0.3836 0.4414 0.0737 0.0208 0.3344 0.0916 
 
 
Table    2   
 
  1 2 
CONST 0.0048 0.0036 
  (0.0704) (0.0801) 
DEF x NSC 0.2466*** 0.2338*** 
  (0.0030) (0.0036) 
∆SIZE - 0.0108*** 
  - (0.0021) 
∆TANG - 0.2188*** 
  - (0.0386) 
∆R&D - 0.0021 
  - (0.0909) 
∆PROF - -0.0201 
  - (0.0300) 
∆CAPEX - 0.0028 
  - (0.0405) 
Adjusted R2 0.4656 0.5188 
Wald (p-values) 0.0000 0.0000 
Firms 818 818 
Observations 7245 7245 
Period 2007 - 2016 2007 - 2016 
 
